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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE > 
Respondent, owner of a surface estate, counterclaimed for 
damages when Appellant, holder of an oil and gas lease, brought 
this action for an order restraining and enjoining Respondent 
from interfering with Appellant's establishment of an oil and 
gas well drill site. ~ ~— — 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court restrained and enjoined Respondent from 
interfering with the-establishment of the well site and then a-
warded judgment against Appellant in the amount of$16,542.00 
and interest for the use of lands in connection with establish-, 
ing the drill site. ^ 
~
 :
 RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the judgment for 
daimages and remand the case to the district court for new find-
ings and entry of a new judgment consistent with the requirements 
of the law and the terms of the Oil and Gas Lease involved. 
K STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1961, Respondent, Anthon Rust and his wife, Ona Rust-, 
purchased the land involved in this case from Gilbert and Ethel 
Beebe. The Rusts, however, did not purchase or acquire any min-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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eral rights with the property. (TR. of Hearing, January, 28, 
1974, Pages 83 & 84) The Beebes reserved from the sale to the 
Rusts all gas, oil, and other mineral rights, The conveyance 
to the Rusts was made by Warranty Deed and after the descrip-
tion of the property in the deed, the following language was 
inserted: "Reserving therefrom all gas, oil, and other miner-
al rights'1. (Exhibit 2) In 1964, Gilbert and Ethel Beebe 
granted to Shell Oil Company an oil and gas lease on the pro-
perty. (Exhibit 3) Appellant, Flying Diamond Corporation, 
then acquired the interest of the lessee, Shell Oil Company, by 
a Farm-Out Agreement and proceeded to prepare to drill a gas 
well. (TR. of Hearing, January 28, 1974, P.15) 
The Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Commission has promul-
gated a spacing order for the particular oil and gas field in 
which the land in question is located, requiring that an oil ; 
or gas well be drilled within a 660-foot radius of the cen-
ter of the Northeast quarter of each section. (TR. 113) In 
the Summer of 1973, Plaintiff's engineer, Mr. Reese, and an 
independent land man hired by Plaintiff, Mr. Wheatley, went 
to look at possible locations for drilling a well. (TR. 38 & 
113) The area within the permissible limitations of the spa-
cing order was viewed and examined, and after walking the area 
-2-
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tnd taking into account the circumstances existing there, it 
ms determined that the only feasible location for a well would 
>e on Defendant's property where it was eventually placed. (TR. 
.13 & 116) 
The decision to place the well there was based on the fact 
:hat the land at that location is higher in elevation than at 
tny other location within the area allowable under the spacing or-
ler. (TR. 40) To put the well to the South of the present site 
on Respondent's land) or to the West (on another landowner's 
property) would have cost up to an extra $40,000.00 (TR. 39 & 
14) doubling the cost of setting up the location. The engineer 
n charge of establishing the location, Mr. Reese, testified 
hat the cost of establishing the location elsewhere within the 
rea allowed by the spacing order would have been very costly 
s fill would have to be obtained from some distance away due 
o the wet and swampy conditions. (TR. 116) No contradictory 
estimony was presented by Respondent. 
The safety of the men working at the location was also ta-
en into account by Mr. Reese who testified about the danger in-
olved when heavy equipment is located on lands without a solid 
ooting. (TR. 114) Mr. Reese further testified that he con-
-3-
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sidered the existing water flow patterns in determining the 
location of the well site and access road and placed them where 
there would be the least amount of interference with water flow* 
(TR. 114) The land where the well was placed is a high spot 
and was covered with sage brush and rocks. (TR. 40) The well 
was located on the only place within the area allowed by the 
spacing order which was not covered with grass and other feed 
for cattle which would have been destroyed by the establishment 
of the location. (TR. 40) 
Once the well location was determined, alternative methods 
of access to the location were considered and discussed with 
the Respondent. The decision to locate the road where it was 
actually built was supported by the following reasons: 
(a) The present route is the shortest distance "from 
the well location to an adequate county road. 
(TR. 33 & 34) 
(b) The construction of a road from the North to the 
well location would have required building a road 
through a swampy area, at great additional expense. 
(TR. 40, 49, 50, 51, 52, & 53) 
(c) A road from the North would have interfered substan-
-4-
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When it became clear that Respondent intended to refuse 
Appellant's crew a right to enter at any location, it was de-
cided to go ahead without further attempts to secure Respon-
dent's cooperation. On January 8, 1974, Appellant took equip-
ment to the area to commence working on the site, but was pro-
hibited by Respondent from entering upon the property. (TR. 16) 
On January 13, 1974, a crew of men returned to the area and 
started to construct a road into the property. (TR. 16) On 
January 13, 1974, a crew of men returned to the area and started 
to construct a road into the property. The Respondent arrived 
shortly thereafter with the Duchesne County Sheriff who required 
the Appellant to obtain a court order before entering upon the 
property. (TR. 16) A temporary order restraining the Respondent 
from interfering with Appellant's operations was promptly secured, 
and a preliminary injunction pending the outcome of the suit was 
entered at a hearing subsequent to that time. The road and the 
well location were then built by the Appellant in January of 1974. 
In December 1974, eleven months after the well site was 
built, Respondent filed its counterclaim and raised its claim 
that the use made by Flying Diamond Corporation was "not reason-
ably necessary to any legitimate purposes of" Appellant. 
-6-
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^CK^kivNi; ON APPLICABLE LAW 
AN 01.., AND ! -AM- LESSH1- IS ENTITLED TO USE THE SURFACE 01- THE 
PREMISES EMBRACED BY ITS OIL AND GAS LEASE WITHOUT LIABILITY 
FOR SURFACE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ITS OPERATIONS ON THE LEASEHOLD, 
SO LONG AS SUCH USE AND THE MANNER OF ITS EXERCISE ARE REASON-
ABLY NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE LEASE 
WAS MADE. 
A- . . , 
of '• ta; • a? decide!! t' < que six- •• • rs, ' * "• r '••;*-: qrli. * i 
v?'.- i t hf q u e s t i ia«! a r i s e n i .. ,< ;u >v * ><* i 
an~ tj<is l e a s e ha^ ^ i ^ L-LgiiL Lu u s e so luacu ui. i_uc s u r f a c e o i uiie 
p r o p e r t " nr* ^ S " ^c r e a s o n a h l v n e c e s s a r v f o r -**-? .->••,--rati ' \ 
Hay i i LLL_. 
rell vs. Parker Drilling Co., 341 : '-: '•- ' ' 1 n • i \7 i lcox 01L 
C. . . . ..... o>.;- u u 2^_i - ~ e U:L-1- U 0 » V S 
Dacus , '*2"5 P . 2d 1035 >•• '• iT^lJll1 {)i-] r ° - ^ Ahrairf. -13 
P ' " L i s e n b a r g c v s . N o r t h e r n Na... 
5as Ct-. 198 F , v.;-;. " K } , o / 2 ^iuwd i y ^ j ^agnc I i^ ~ -.. -. r d , 
1 . . . . . l i . LU: -• . ^ • and Marl and Oi 1 t,i-. v s . Hubbard . .68 
Dkla . ^ i o , ->~r i- • ii-vi £- I O • O d e JO .AJLJIV 
:ases froni +_uc ^ ~ "•"" ~>w! nr ?t?tcc applying t haf v;.! Ca. 1 form a, 
3ol orado , Wyomi rig, Knurls * . .;-
Lssippi., Louisiana, Arkansas, Montana, New Mexico, Alabama, North 
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Dakota, West Virginia, Illinois, and Canada. No cases applying 
any other rule are cited. 
The writers who have treated this subject concur unani-
mously in supporting Appellant's position on the law. See for 
example: 4 Summers Oil and Gas, Section 652, Permanent Edition, 
1962; 1 Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, Section 218.7; 
2 American Law of Property, Section 10.28; American Law of 
Mining, Volume I, Section 3.50; and 1 Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Institute, 85. L. Sellers, "How Dominant is the Dominant 
Estate, Or, Surface Damages Revisited11, Thirteenth Annual In-
stitute Southwest Legal Foundation^ 377. T. J. McMahon, 
"Rights and Liabilities with Respect to Surface Usage by Min-
eral Lessee", Sixth Annual Institute Southwest Legal Foundation, 
231. 
A cause of action for damages by a surface owner against 
a mineral lessee must proceed either on a theory of tort and 
negligence or a theory of contract and breach of covenants. An 
oil and gas lessee may injure land, crops and improvements with-
out responding in damages if no tort or contractual liability 
can be shown. 53 ALR 3d 16 at 33, and cases cited there. As 
stated at Page 31 of 53 ALR 3d: 
-8-
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• •.
 !f
 i n cases involving alleged damages r?n the 
surface of the leasehold, the legal princI pie'employ-
, ed by the courts as a starting point for a determinant.;. 
of the problem is that an. oil and gas lease creates and 
vests in the lessee ;ne dominant estate ". •••*.• surface 
of the leasehold for the attainment: of i he ! *. Ultimate 
purposes of the lease, the holder of the dunmant estate 
being permitted to occupy such space and do such damage 
as i s reasonably necessary to CUIKIUC t t.-'c operations 
permitted by the lease, because the lessor. through 
the mineral lease, authorized by implication such con-. 
duct by the 1 essee, and no recovery is allowed ioi 
damage resulting from, authorized conduct. '1 hus , it 
. is often stated that an oi 1 <•••<! ;*v- lessee jt~ enti-
tled to use the surface of the premises embraced by 
his oil and gas lease without liability for surface 
damage caused by his operations on the leasehold, so 
long as such use and the manner of i ts exercise are 
•A,,, reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes for , .  . 
'. whi ch the 1 ease was made ,f 
The ^ u r c j e n ^s 0 n t|ie surface owner to s 1 low t:hat: the owr ie r 
of the mineral i nterest was excessive i n his use of the surface 
< ' * t I n eg "I igeiil: des true t: 1 on ncci :i i: red Cities.. ,Ser-, 
vice_Oii Co^vs, Dacus , 325 P. 2d, .1035 (Okla ) 1 958; Mar land 
L L . i- -.I. . MU -J <± Li: 3 6 8 Ok ] a 51 8, 3 ' i I '.. 2 < :! 21 8 (] 9 34 ) :; No rum vs . 
Queer- City Oil Co I \ont. 527, 264 P. 1 22 (] 928); and. 53 
/ . . rous cases therein ci ted It: i s nec-
essary to specify and prove specif ic acLo oi ac^»! {ecutL in order 
for the surface owner to recover f~r damages rrr.s ,, v-* 5-1 .^-•1 
and gas lessee's excessive su*-1;* .s: .. . anc 
-9-
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Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 7 Baylor L.Rev. 188, 191 
(1958). See also 53 ALR 3d 16 at 35 and 36. To sustain a cause 
of action based on alleged negligence, the Plaintiff must prove 
not only negligence but also proximate cause. Hurley vs. Nor-
thern Pacific Railway Company, 455 P.2d 321 (Mont. 1969). 
The surface owner is not entitled to compensation for the 
minerals taken or the use made of the surface. Kinney-Coastal 
Oil Co. vs. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488 (1928); Holbrook vs. Contin-
ental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955). The severence 
of the mineral and surface interests places a servitude on the 
surface. This servitude or implied easement has the same'effect 
as if the parcel of land were sold with an easement expressly 
reserved, and the effect is that the surface and mineral owners 
are co-tenants of the property. Since the mineral interest is 
the dominant interest, the owner thereof is entitled to possess 
so much of the surface as is necessary to explore for and ex-
tract the minerals. The surface is not taken in the sense spo-
ken of in condemnation suits, instead the mineral owner uses his 
implied easement to occupy so much of the surface as is necess-
ary for as long as there is exploration or production. When 
those activities cease, the mineral owner's rights cease and sur-
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Co. v s . Hubbard , 168 Ok La, '; : •* * w;. 
Mag-
G a r l a n d O i l 
"I I if I a i n;ioci.r I I I it* i 11 I .s -
e n t 'when it . i s u n d e r s t o o d Lb--* v O n e r a i r i g h t s a r e r e s c i v c i 
. _ • ;I;'"PO natura ^oe? nnt" o ^ f a ^ a^ va 1^ 
JL i e 
#n 
;nL W^ ^LI the minerals aic conveyed wi "y . 
s s monp" i s or „. ; A C~ 1 and when t -L m i n e r a l r i g h t s nave 
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71 9 , 61 SE2d 833 (1 9.50) The p r i c e is,,: l o w e r f or two r easons , 
F i r s t ^
 n o i nc i rm# a n i I M> : > ? m t i c i pa t e d from t h e iiil neral e x t r a c t ! on ; 
and. s e c o n d , t h e s u r t a c e owner knows t h a t t he u se of t h e s u r f a c e 
^ • joe I '" ' '• . a s o n a h l c us. nl l lie m i n e r a l owner i n 
bi-> ( x p i o r a t i ' . r r . p r o d u c t i o n ^bl e x t r a ^ w i u . i
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face owners operations would be giving him a more valuable es-
tate than the one he originally contracted to buy. 
.
 :
 ' ARGUMENT 
•*•-' I . / ' -
THE OIL AND GAS LEASE PROVISION THAT LESSEE SHALL "PAY FOR 
DAMAGE DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY CAUSED BY ITS OPERATIONS TO 
GROWING CROPS THERETOFORE PLANTED ON SAID LAND11 DOES NOT EN-
TITLE THE SURFACE OWNER TO BE COMPENSATED FOR THE USE OF THE 
LAND. 
Paragraph No. 1 of the Oil and Gas Lease held by Respon-
dent provides in pertinent part as follows: 
" . . . . Lessor . . . has this day granted, demised, 
leased, and let, and hereby grants, demises, leases, 
and lets exclusively unto Lessee for the purpose of 
investigating, exploring, and prospecting, by geo-
physical and other methods, and drilling, mining and 
operating for and producing oil, gas, casing-head 
gas, and casing-head gasoline, laying pipelines, build-
ing tanks, stations, power lines, telephone lines and 
other structures thereon to find, produce, save, store, 
treat, transport, and take care of all such substances, 
* and for housing and boarding employees in its opera-
tions on said land or adjacent land . . . . !l 
There appears to be no question that the mineral lease in-
volved authorizes the holder thereof to establish a well site and 
build an access road to it as was done by Appellant in this case. 
Any liability on the part of Appellant to compensate. Respondent 
for having built the road and well site must be based, then, on 
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of the law that so long as the use made of the surface by the 
lessee of the mineral interest is reasonable there is no lia-
bility for damages, the court found that the Defendants were 
entitled to compensation for the reasonable value of the land. 
The court then found the fa,Ir market value of the land and a-
warded damages in that amount. 
At times, a deed, patent, lease or other instrument will 
contain specific language to require payment of damages for 
such things as growing crops. These matters are the subject 
of negotiation between buyer and seller at the time the trans-
action takes place. Language representative of that used in 
patents and other conveyances is found in Paragraph No. 10 of 
the Oil and Gas Lease before the Court in this case, which pro-
vides that the lessee shall pay "for damage directly and imme-
diately caused by its operations to growing crops theretofore 
planted on said land.11 
Because of the general use of the term "growing crops11 
in patents, leases and other instruments relevant in land and 
mineral law, this term has been reviewed by the courts and has 
:
 a well established meaning. For example, Black's Law Diction-
ary, Deluxe Fourth Edition, defines crops as follows: "Such 
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can find that the 5.88 acres of surface 'taken1 for 
the well site and the road was in excess of that rea-
sonably necessary, or that its use by the Plaintiff is 
unreasonable to accomplish the purposes contemplated 
for the lease." ' 
The Court then, in Paragraph No. 4 of the Memorandum Decision, 
stated: 
"Defendant is entitled to compensation for the rea-
sonable value of the 5.88 acres of land taken for 
the well site and road under Paragraph No. 10 of the 
lease dated April 6, 1964.fl 
The Court then referred to the requirement of Paragraph No. 10 
that damages to growing crops be paid and stated that it found 
that the lands used for the road and drill site had thereon grow-
ing crops. The Court then held that because the use of the land 
under the drill site and road was denied to the surface owner 
that the measure of the value of the growing crops was the fair 
market value of the land. 
The specific language of the lease reads: ff . . . and 
shall pay for damage directly and immediately caused by its 
operations to growing crops theretofore planted on said land.11 
(Emphasis added) The fact is that there were no growing crops 
on the properties involved when the well site and road were 
built. (TR. 16 & 17) The ground was covered with two feet of 
-16-
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snow. Any reasonable construction given the word "growing" 
rules out assessing damages for crops which might be planted 
in the future as the Court did here. Also, what do the words 
"theretofore planted" mean? They can reasonably be said to mean 
those crops planted prior to the point in time when the use was 
made of the surface by the oil and gas lessee. Furthermore, the 
only testimony concerning the planting of any plants was that 
Defendant had "throwed some grass seed on all my pastures". 
(TR. 84 & 85) Likewise, are we to ignore the words 'directly 
and immediately caused1? The trial court did. There is no tes-
timony as to the value of any crops growing at the time of con-
struction because there were no growing crops. It was winter, 
furthermorer Mr., Gerber testified that he looked and was unable 
:o find any stand, of tame or seeded grasses on the lands, but 
:ound instead native or wild grasses interspersed with sagebrush. 
'TR. 140) Grasses and forage are not usually considered crops 
md then only when they are seeded or harvested annually. AM- " 
estimony of damages presented by Respondent related to damages 
o land, not to growing crops, and Appellant has voiced its dis-
pproval of this "eminent domain" approach to the case continu-
usly since the pre-trial conference in this action when it saw 
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that the court might adopt such a concept;. (TR. 30) To ill-
ustrate how far from "growing crops theretofore planted on said 
land" and "directly and immediately11 damaged, the trial court 
went in its decision one need only consider that the rationale 
used by the court to require compensation here would equally 
apply if the land involved were non-agricultural, for example, 
a parking lot. Whether the owner of the surface estate is de-
prived of the use of land, the test used by the trial court is" 
simply an impermissible judicial rewriting of the lease agree-
ment. No justification of the use of that test can be found 
in the language of Paragraph No. 10 of the lease. The error 
which the court below fell into is caused by its failure to 
adhere to the language of the agreement or to distinguish be-
tween an eminent domain case where the test used might be per-
missible, and the case at hand where the mineral lessee is ac-
tually a co-owner of the property and owns a right to use so 
much of the surface as is necessary to develop his dominant 
estate. The lower court appears to have forgotten completely 
that it expressly based its decision that compensation was due 
for 5.88 acres on Paragraph No. 10 of the lease. It leaped to 
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the conclusion that damages assessed should be based on denial of 
use. The court even used the language of eminent domain and re-
fers to lands as being "taken". 
When by contract the parties have agreed that the surface^ 
owner will be paid damages for growing crops, the method of cal-
culating damages is well established. The measure of damages for 
injury to growing crops is the potential value of the crop as it 
stood on the ground at the time and place of its destruction, the 
yalue at the time of the loss" being determined by the probable r 
yield of the crop when matured and its reasonable probable mar-
ket value when matured, less the probable future production 
:osts of cultivating, harvesting, transporting and marketing, --
:ities Service Gas Company vs. Christian, 340 P.2d 929 (Okla. 
L959); 53 ALR 3rd 16 at 53. Furthermore, damages are awarded < 
>nly for the crops on the land actually used by the lessee in 
.ts operations. See for example Frankfort Oil Co.- vs. Abrams, 
.59 Colo. 535, 413 P.2d 190, (1966), where the trial court allow-
ed damages for depreciation in the value of thePlaintifffs * , 
•anch as a unit, but the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed 
nd held that damages were only applicable to the lands actu-
-19-
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ally used by the lessee in the operations. 
In the case of the language in the lease before the Court, 
the damages allowed are only those "directly and immediately 
caused to growing crops theretofore planted.11 Because of the 
eminent domain concept asserted by Respondent and the Court's 
adoption of those concepts, the only evidence before the Court 
was to do with land values. Not one sentence of testimony was 
presented by Respondent with respect to the value of crops 
growing on the land. Appellant respectfully submits that the 
judgment of the court below should be reversed and the case be 
remanded for entry of new findings, that no evidence was pre-
sented on the issue of damages to growing crops. : , 
A ROAD PERMITTING ACCESS TO THE DRILL SITE ESTABLISHED BY 
APPELLANT WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY AND APPELLANT ACTED REA-
SONABLY IN LOCATING AND CONSTRUCTING THE ROAD IT BUILT. 
In the absence of an express provision in the lease to 
the contrary, the location of wells, access roads and the ne-
cessary facilities is to be determined by the oil operator, ) 
not by the surface owner. Gulf Oil Corp. vs. Marathon Oil 
Co., 152 SW2d 711, 724; Stephenson vs. Glass, 276 SW 1110; 
Hoffman vs. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 260 SW 950; Felmont Oil 
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Corp. vs. Pan American Petroleum Corp,, 334 SW2d 449, 456. The 
general rule on the question; is stated in the following quota-
tion from a California case: 
"If a particular facility is necessary and convenient 
to the operation of the oil and mineral owner, it may 
be placed anywhere upon the surface area in which he 
has the right of user, so long as such, placement, is 
reasonable under prevailing conditions and even though 
such placement in particular instances may work a hard-
ship on the surface owner. ,. Wall vs. Shell Oil Company, 
209 Cal. App. 2d 504, 25 Cal.Rptr. 908, 911." 
At Page 915, the California Court in Wall further stated: ...._. 
11
 . . . ... No owner of a particular surface division 
could be heard to assert that the particular place-
ment of a facility was unreasonable solely because it 
,/could have been placed elsewhere just conveniently." 
The courts have specifically held that the issue is not a ques-
tion of inconvenience to the surface owner, and to so instruct 
a jury is error. Getty Oil vs. Jones, 470 SW2d 618, 53 ALR 3d 
1 at 14 (Tex. 1971). To hold otherwise would be to say that the 
nineral estate is not really the dominant estate. Notwithstand-
ing the overwhelming case authority on this point, the trial 
:ourt in this case in its Memorandum Decision dated July 1, 1975, 
rhich was incorporated into its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
>f Law at Paragraph No. 1 thereof stated in pertinent part: 
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"The location of the road where it was located was 
not reasonably necessary, and unreasonably inter-
feres with the surface owner's pre-existing use of 
the surface . . . fl 
In order to prevail on the issue in this case under the 
correct interpretation of the rule of law, Respondent has the 
burden of showing that Appellant in the establishment of the 
well location and the road, and in operating its facilities, 
used an amount of property in excess of that reasonably necess-
ary, or that it caused destruction by its wanton and negligent 
conduct. Cities Service Oil Co. vs. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035 (Okla.) 
1958. Marland Oil vs. Hubbard, 168 Okla. 518, 34 P.2d 278 (1934) 
Norum vs. Queen City Oil Co., 81 Mont, 527, 264 P. 122 (1928); 
and 53 ALR 3rd 16 at 49, and numerous cases therein cited. No 
evidence before the Court shows that Appellant used more land 
than necessary for the operations allowed by the lease. The 
trial court so found. There is no evidence that Appellant was 
negligent in selecting the location of the access road to the 
well site. The evidence is clear that Appellant made a careful 
and professional analysis of the alternatives available for the 
establishment of the well location and the road, and the record 
is void of testimony by any person who even studied the alterna-
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tives other than Appellant's engineers arid construction people 
who found the well and road location not only reasonable, but 
the most reasonable. 
Appellant's case below was based on the contention that the 
drill site and road should have been placed off Respondent's 
property and on that of a neighbor's in the wet, swampy area to 
the south of the present location,This contention is made de-
spite the obvious extra expense, risk to safety of men and equip-
ment, and substantial disruption of water flows the other loca-
tion would entail. The only reason given in support of this con-
tention is that Respondent would have preferred it since he did 
not own the mineral rights. No evidence is before the Court 
that would indicate that the choices made by the Appellant were 
unreasonable under the circumstances. There is no evidence that 
a reasonable oil and gas operator would have done anything diff-
erent than-Appellant did. Decisions as to where to drill oil 
wells and build roads required to carry heavy equipment where 
heavy equipment and mens' lives are involved are made by high-
Ly trained engineers and not by farmers or lawyers. Gulf Oil 
:orp, vg. Marathon Oil Co., 152 SW2d 711, 724; Stephenson YS, 
Mass, 276 SW 1110; Hoffman vs. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,-£60 
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SW 950; Felmont Oil Corp. vs. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 
334 SW2d 449, 456. 
Respondent has not met his burden of showing that what 
was done by Plaintiff was unreasonable. It is not Appellant's 
burden to support the reasonableness of the location of the 
access road but that of Respondent to show it unreasonable. The 
evidence indicates that Appellant considered the alternatives 
and picked the only location feasible for both the well site and 
the access road, and further that every reasonable effort was . 
made to get along with Respondent in arranging and establishing 
the location. Appellant has cooperated with fencing, attempted 
to help with irrigation problems, established cattle guards, 
and has otherwise conducted itself in a very reasonable and pro-
fessional manner, doing many things which it was not obligated 
to do under the law. 
The road built for access to the well site was calculated 
to interfere with water flow in the least possible manner rea-
sonably consistent with the necessities of the project. (TR. 
114) To have built the road from the north would have inter-
fered with the southeasterly flow of water toward the entire
 w 
eastern eighty acres of Respondent's property rather than just 
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the fifteen acres which the court below found affected. (TR. 47) 
Although the trial court failed to state what reasonable al-
ternatives to locating the access road it thought available, It 
is assumed that it concurred with Respondent's preference stated 
at trial that it be built from the north along the fence. (TR. 
of Hearing, January 28, 1974, P. 46;- also, TR. 54 & 66) The 
court found that thelocation of the road disrupted the flow of 
water to the southern fifteen acres of Respondent's property. 
Both Appellant's witnesses (TR. 40, 67 & 114) and Respondent 
himself testified that the flow of the water north of the well 
site was southeasterly. To build the road where Respondent 
asked that it be built would have disrupted the flow of water 
to eighty acres, not just fifteen acres. (TR. of Hearing, 
January 28, 1974, P. 60) Appellant considered that fact in lo-
cating the road as well as the fact that the road would have to 
De built through a swamp, at great expense, (TR. 48, 49, 50, 51, 
>2, & 53) that a county road would have tro be improved so as to 
landle the increased traffic and a bridge would probably have to 
>e replaced at great expenses-. (TR. 114, 115 & 116) There -
appears-to be no dispute in the evidence that if Appellant had 
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built the road on the line from the north along the fence as 
desired by Respondent, Respondent would have been affected sub-
stantially more as concerns water flows than with the road at 
its present location. 
Appellant considered all of these factors in its decision. 
Apparently the trial court disagreed with Appellant's conclu-
sion as to where the road should be located. That, however, 
is not the test. The test is whether Appellant was negligent 
or wanton. Neither is the test that urged by Respondent in the 
lower court that the facilities be constructed so as to inflict 
the least possible damage upon the surface estate. To carry 
that position to its logical extreme could require use of a 
helicoptor or an elevated road built on stilts for access to 
the well location. Although the lower court did not expressly 
say it was using the test of "least possible damage" only by 
that test could the court reach the conclusion it did on the 
basis of the evidence before it. The Court did expressly refer 
to the test as the "possible alternative" rule. The correct 
test is whether Appellant acted reasonably as a reasonably pru-
dent operator would act. There is a substantial difference be-
tween a test requiring Appellant to act reasonably and a test 
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requiring it to adopt a possible alternative inflicting the 
least possible damage upon the surface. Under the correct test 
and the evidence before the Court, there can be no question but 
that Appellant acted within its rights and that no damages may 
be assessed. 
From the commencement of the discussions between the Appell-
ant and the Respondent regarding the establishment of a well lo-
cation, Respondent took.the position that Appellant had, with-
out authority to do so, attempted to commence a condemnation 
action, that a hearing of immediate occupancy.was required, and 
that a bond must be obtained and a sum of money paid to Respon-
dent before Appellant had any right to go on the lands. (TR. 
2,9) See also Defendant's Memorandum of Authorities dated Feb-
ruary ,1, 1974, submitted to the Court arguing that the temporary 
)rder restraining Respondent from interfering with Appellant's 
operations should be immediately dissolved and that Appellant be 
equired to bring an eminent domain proceeding or depart from 
he premises. (TR. of Hearing, January 28, 1974, P. 12) The 
ourt at that time properly denied Respondent's request and con-
inued the protective order against Respondent's erroneous and 
ibending position that Appellant had no right to go on the pro-
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perty without first paying Respondent. Coupled with that position 
was Respondents unreasonable view that the Appellant must com< 
pensate Respondent in amounts ranging between $60,000.00 and 
$90,000.00 for the 5.88 acres of sagebrush pasture used for the 
well location and the road crossing less than an acre of hay pas-
ture. See Defendant's counterclaim praying for damages in the a-
mount of $91,000.00. Faced with Respondent's unreasonable posi-
tion and the fact that the Oil and Gas Lease imposed upon Appell-
ant the obligation of drilling or forfeiting the lease, Respon-
dent took the only course reasonable under the circumstances: 
first, Appellant attempted to discuss the matter with Respondent; 
second, it commenced work on the project; and, third, when re-
quired by Respondent, it obtained a protective court order. Un-
der this set of conditions, Appellant had to judge for itself 
without any cooperation from Respondent such things as where to -
put culverts, cattleguards, roads and gates. The attitude of 
Respondent is one of the circumstances which the Court should 
consider in determining whether Appellant's acts were reasonable 
at the time. 
Not until after the trial (See TR. 29) and in his Trial 
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Memorandum did Respondent concede that the Appellant might have_ 
some rights to go on the property without buying it as in an em-
inent domain proceedingsbut he still persisted in quoting em-
inent domain statutes and discussing the case in terms of a 
"taking for public use" and performing in the manner causing 
"least possible injury" to the surface. (See Defendant:^Mem-
orandum datedMay 1, 1975 at Page 8) Using the concepts and lan-
guage of eminent domain law led the lower court here into error 
as it did the trial court in Getty Oil vs. Jones-y 470 SW2d 618, 
53 ALR 3d 1 at 14 (Tex. 1971), iri which the court stated that it 
was reversible error to make inconvenience to the surface owner 
an issue, and in Frankfort Oil Co. vs. Abrams, 413 P.2d 190 (1966) 
159 Colo. 535, where the trial court was reversed for awarding < 
damages for depreciation of a ranch as a unit as is done in em-
inent domain cases. The trial court, however, was improperly in*-
fluenced by these eminent domain concepts and included in its 
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
such concepts as a "taking" and "depreciation of the value of 
nearby lands" and damages to growing crops in the amount of 
"the"fair market value of the lands." The judgment of the trial 
court should be reversed and the case remanded for-application ^  
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of correct principles. 
III. 
APPELLANT IS NOT LIABLE TO RESPONDENT FOR ANY DAMAGES CAUSED 
BY A BREACH OF ANY COVENANT, CONDITION OR OBLIGATION EXPRESS 
OR .IMPLIED UNTIL SIXTY DAYS AFTER RESPONDENT HAS GIVEN WRITTEN 
NOTICE SETTING OUT SPECIFICALLY IN WHAT RESPECTS IT IS CLAIMED 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN BREACHED. 
Respondent has claimed damages alleging a breach of lessee's 
obligation to act reasonably in locating its facilities and oper-
ating them. Appellant submits that if Respondent is to claim the 
benefit of the provisions in the Oil and Gas Lease, he should be 
required to comply with the terms of the lease himself with re-
gard to the required notice, thus affording Appellant an oppor-
tunity to remedy any such breach. Paragraph No. 13 of the lease 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
H
 . . . . In the event lessor considers that lessee 
has not complied with all its covenants, conditions, 
or obligations hereunder, both express and implied, 
lessor shall notify lessee in writing setting out 
specifically in what respects it is claimed that 
lessee has breached his contract, and lessee shall 
v not be liable to lessor for any damages caused by a 
breach of any such covenant, condition, or obliga-
tion, express or implied, accruing more than sixty 
days prior to the receipt by lessee of the afore-
said written notice of such breach.11 
Respondent has not given notice, written or oral, to Appellant: 
specifying breach of covenant under the lease. To the contrarry, 
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Respondent first disclaimed anything to do with any lease. The 
trial court imposed upon the Appellant the obligation to pay for 
damages to Respondent's lands finding Appellant acted unreasona-
bly in locating the access road where it did, but the court fail-
ed to require Respondent to meet the condition precedent to such 
compensation by giving notice and sixty days within which to cor-
rect the situation. See Getty vs. Jones, 470 SW2d 618 (Tex.) 
where a similar provision was found in the lease involved and 
where the court ordered that time be given to correct any defi-
ciency in the lessee's activities. Appellant should be given an 
opportunity for sixty days to remedy any problems which it may 
have caused by acts contrary to or unauthorized by the provi- ,. 
sions of the lease which Respondent claims to be a third party 
beneficiary. Specifically, time to relocate the road or remedy 
the interference to the irrigation system if it is found to un-
reasonably interfere. 
. , : , * i v . , • - •>••• - - •:,••.•-• 
WHILE APPELLANT DOES NOT AGREE THAT GETTY OIL CO. VS. JONES 
GOVERNS OR SHOULD GOVERN THE DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE, THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT TO SUPPORT THE AWARD OF DAM-
AGES FOR LOCATION OF THE ACCESS ROAD EVEN IF THE RULE OF THE 
GETTY CASE IS FOLLOWED. ^
 7, ...... -
The trial court in the instant case stated that it adopted 
-31-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the general concept of the Getty case as to the relative rights 
of the surface and mineral owners. ~ -^,*. • .. 
-- In Getty Oil Co. vs. Jones, 470 SW2d 618, (Tex. 1971), Jones, 
the surface owner of a tract of land, sued for an injunction to 
restrain Getty Oil Company, an oil and gas lessee, from using 
vertical spacefor two beam-type pumping units, one 17-feet 
high, and the other 34-feet high. Because of their height, the 
pumps precluded the use of Jones automatic irrigation sprink-
ler system. Upon trial, the jury found that it was not reason-
ably necessary for Getty to install pumps that prevented the op-
eration of;:the irrigation system. The trial court then grant-
ed Getty1s motion for Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto om the ru,. 
ground there was no evidence that Getty used more lateral surface 
than reasonably necessary. —•- . — 
Upon, appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas first held that, 
the reasonably necessary limitation extends to the superadja-
cent airspace as well as to the lateral surface and subsurface 
of the land. Getty argued that the. placement of ttLe. beam-type 
pumping units on the surface was authorized by the lease as a 
matter of law. The court then stated the issue to be decided as 
fallows.: ;: — - < *
 r ^ * 
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"The question to be resolved, then, is whether evi-
dence may be entertained to show the effect of Getty's 
manner of surface use upon the use of the surface by 
Jones, together with the nature of alternatives avail-
able to Getty, in resolving the issue of reasonable 
necessity.11 
The majority of the court in the Getty case confirmed that 
it is: 
"well settled that the oil and gas estate is the domi-
nant estate in the sense that use of as much of the 
premises as is reasonably necessary to produce and re-
move the minerals is held to be impliedly authorized 
by the lease". 
The court recognized that in some cases there may be only one 
manner of use of the surface whereby the minerals can be pror-
duced and that in such a case the lessee has the right to pur-
sue this use, regardless of surface damage. The court went on 
to say that where there is an existing use by the surface owner 
which would be precluded, and where under the established prac-
tices in the industry there are alternatives available to the 
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of rea-
sonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an al-
ternative by the lessee. 
*
n
 Getty, the surface owner, Jones, presented testimony 
that a critical shortage of labor available to farms in the area 
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necessitated the use of automatic sprinkling equipment in irri- + 
gating the land. A petroleum engineer, a witness for Jones, tes-
tified as to the costs of the construction by Getty of cellars for 
the housing of the two pumping units and as to their feasibility. 
He also testified with regard to the installation of a different 
kind of pump which could have been used to avoid the interfer-
ence with the use of the automatic sprinkler irrigation system. 
Another witness for Jones was a pumper for another oil company 
who was at the time operating two beam-type pumps in cellars and 
twenty-five beam-type pumps on the surface. He testified that 
less maintenance was necessary on the unit in the cellars than 
on the ones on the surface and that there was less leakage of 
hydrogen sulfide gas. Jones1 evidence showed that there were a-
vailable to Getty two types of pumping installations which were 
reasonable alternatives to its present use of the surface, nei-
ther of which precluded the use of the existing irrigation sys-
tem, and that two other oil companies were currently employing 
those alternative methods under their leases on other portions 
of Jones1 tract of land. 
The court said in determining whether the use made of the 
surface by the mineral lessee is reasonable the trier of fact 
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could consider the use being made by the servient surface owner, 
as one of the factors in determining whether the use is reason-
able. "* 
On motion for rehearing the court stated: 
"If the manner of use selected by the dominant mineral * 
lessee is the only reasonable, usual and customary method 
that is available for developing and producing minerals 
on this particular land then the owner of the servient 
estate must yield. However, if there are other usual, 
customary and reasonable methods practiced in the indus-
try on similar lands put to similar uses which would not 
interfere with the existing uses being made by the servient 
surface owner, it could be unreasonable for the lessee to 
employ an interfering method or manner of use.11 
The trial court in Getty was reversed because the jury 
instruction called for a weighing of the evidence of harm or , — 
inconvenience to Jones against the considerations pertaining to -
Getty. The Court specifically held that the test is not one of 
inconvenience to the surface owner and to suggest so in a jury 
instruction is reversible error. The case was sent back to the 
trial court for re-trial with a proper jury instruction and with 
the instruction that in the event it was found that Getty was 
making an unreasonable use of the surface, Getty would have the 
right to install non-interfering" pumps whereupon it would not be liable 
for permanent damages to the land. 
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• The Getty decision has been a controversial one. Two judges 
vigorously dissented arguing that the majority had made the dom-
inant estate servient and the servient estate dominant by not 
holding as a matter of law that the use of the beam-type pumping 
units were authorized by the lease. Motions for rehearing were 
filed twice and the court filed an opinion on one of them further 
elaborating and justifying the decision. No less than four separ-
ate opinions were written by the Supreme Court of Texas in deciding 
the case and handling the confusion and uproar following the decisj 
Shortly after Getty the Texas Supreme Court decided the case 
of Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 15, Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 394, 483, SW2d 
808 (1972). The Sun case involved the use by the mineral lessee, 
Sun, of subterranean water in its waterflood operation. Sun ar-
gued that it had the right to free use of the water on two theor-
ies: (1) the implied right of mineral lessee to use such part 
of the surface as was necessary to effectuate the purposes of 
the lease, and (2) the express provision in the lease granting a 
free right to use of water. The Texas Court held, that Getty did nc 
apply to this fact situation, but that it would only apply to a 
case where there was a reasonable alternative method available to 
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the lessee on the premises. The court went on to hold that it 
need not decide if the express contract provision applied be-
cause Sun had the implied right to free use of so much of the 
freshwater in question, as.may be reasonably necessary to pro-
duce the. oil from its wells. This implied grant was implied by 
law in all conveyances of a. mineral estate and could not be al-
tered by evidence that the parties to a particular instrument of 
conveyance did not intend the legal consequences of the grant un-
less an express limitation on the grant was stated in the convey-
ance. , 
The court held that the.use of fresh water was reasonably; 
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease because Sun's 
attempts to use available salt water had failed, there was no 
other source of water on the premises, and to require Sun to buy 
water from other sources or owners of other tracts in the area 
would be in derogation of the dominant, estate. Behind the de-
cision in the Sun case is the reasoning that to require the hold-
er of the dominant estate tQlppk for help off his premises would 
demean the dominant estate; the tail would be wagging the dog. 
Under the facts it was determined better public policy to limit 
the alternatives the lessee would have to, consider, to those 
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available without going off the premises to secure resources 
which were available on the premises. 
In its Memorandum Decision of July 1, 1975, the trial court 
in the instant case in Paragraph No. 3 thereof adopted an appro-
ch somewhat similar to that in the Sun case with regard to al-
ternatives for locating the well site and said that the rule 
should apply only to alternatives on the premises. When it 
came, however, to the location of the access road it: did not 
refer to this same limitation. 
It should be remembered that the Getty case represents an 
extension in Texas of what has been the law in all states which 
have decided the issue. As the law stands in 17 of the 18 jur-
isdictions considering the issue, in order for a mineral lessee 
to be liable to a surface owner for surface damages, the surface 
owner has the burden of bringing an action in negligence, or in 
the alternative, charging that the lessee has used more space '/;•  
than is reasonably necessary to effectuate the terms of his lease 
The Getty case added the concept that the pre-existing use of 
the surface, and reasonable alternative methods of use, were fac-
tors which could be considered in determining whether the lessee 
acted reasonably in determining how much surface to use. Getty 
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dealt entirely with the amount of surface used; i.e., vertical 
space and the question of whether the lessee used more space 
than reasonably necessary. Getty said nothing with regard to 
the action based on negligence, i.e., whether in exercising its 
right to use so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary, 
the mineral lessee acted reasonably. Where the question in-
volves not the amount of surface, but how that space is used or • 
where facilities are located, the test is still negligence even 
in Texas under Getty. To hold otherwise would be to say that the 
mineral estate is no longer dominant and put courts into the po-
sition of deciding how to operate oil wells. 
S Appellant submits that the Respondent cannot prevail in this 
action on its claim that it is entitled to damages because of 
y 
the building of the access road, either under the law accepted 
in all states other than Texas, or under the Getty rule. The 
Respondent in this case has not presented the kind of case Jones 
did in the Getty case. The record is barren of any evidence 
presented by Respondent that any reasonable Alternative existed 
to locating the access road other than where it was eventually 
located. The only evidence presented with regard to the reason-
ableness of the location of the access road in this case was pre-
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sented by Appellant. In Getty, Jones showed that two reasonable 
alternatives were available to Getty at the time the pumps were 
installed. Jones showed that those alternatives were reasonable, 
usual, and customary in the industry, and that they were both 
actually being used by other companies on lands owned by Jones. 
Respondent in this case presented no such kind of evidence, no 
evidence concerning costs, interference with irrigation water 
were the road to be built from the north, safety, work to be re-
quired on the county road, and bridge or any other kind of fac-
tual analysis or expert testimony regarding the feasilbility of 
using another way of access to the well site. The sum total of 
the evidence presented by Respondent on this issue was that he 
did not want the road at all, but that if it had to come, he 
wanted it to come from the north along the fence through the 
swamp. (TR. 66 & TR. of Hearing, January 28, 1974). 
On the other hand, Appellant's evidence is uncontra-
dicted that an analysis of the conditions as they existed at 
the time was made by Appellant's engineers and construction • 
people, that calculations were made and alternatives discussed 
(TR. 113, 114, 115 & 116) and that reasonable conclusions were 
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Irawn from that analysis which determined that the location of 
:he road at its present place interfered least with the flow ,., 
>f waters on the tract, was least expensive, used the least a-
lount of Respondent's land, and in every other way was the most 
•easonable access to the location. (TR. 113 & 114) Unlike 
n Getty where~thfecourt specified what it found to be, the rea-
onable alternatives to the beam-type pumps the trial court here 
imply said: 
"The location of the road where it was located was not 
reasonably necessary and unreasonably interferes with 
. the surface owner's pre-existing use of the surface11. 
ere the trial court could specify no alternatives to'the location 
f the access road because none were presented by Respondent and 
ppellant's evidence showed that the only feasible location was 
lere it was built. Appellant submitsuthat the evidence does 
}t support a finding that Appellant had reasonable alternatives 
) building the access road as it did. :>--••?yyy-*^.^- ^r-. 
Furthermore, if we apply the limitation of the Sun case to 
te Getty rule of reasonable alternatives, those alternatives 
LSt be limited to those available on the premises. If the trial 
oirt chooses to look at reasonable alternatives as in Getty, it 
ould limit those alternatives to those-available on*the premises 
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as stated in Sun. In this case under that rule Appellant 
k.A should not be required to go great distances to haul in fill 
material to build a road from the north if fill is available 
on Respondent's property any more than Sun should be required 
to go off the premises and purchase water. If Appellant were 
to construct an access road from the north along the fence as 
requested by Respondent, would not Appellant have the use of 
fill material available on Respondent's property to do so? Cer* 
tainly under the Sun case the answer would be yes. If not, the 
mineral estate is not really the dominant estate. To build the 
access road from the north and use the fill material available 
from Respondent's fields might be an alternative available al-
though there is no evidence regarding that in the case. If 
that were to occur, Respondent's surface use would be more sub-
stantially interrupted than has occurred. The building of the 
road straight across the property from the county road to the 
well site without making cuts or darning off swales was the sim-
plest, least expensive, least detrimental approach that could 
have been taken. No evidence before the Court indicates otherwise 
-ALTHOUGH THE COURT STATED THAT IT ADOPTED THE GENERAL CONCEPT -
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OF THE LAW AS SET OUT IN THE CASE OF GETTY OIL CO. VS.vJONES 
AS TO THE RELATIVE RIGHTS-.OF THE SURFACE AND MINERAL OWNEESi 
IT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE RULE INSTEAD 
OF.THE .RULE STATED BY THE COURT : IK GETTY. 
v, Appellant respectfully submits that one need only read the 
Memorandum Decision of July 1, 1975 which was incorporated into 
thfe* Court's Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law to see thak~ 
the trial court really did not apply the Getty rule in this. case. 
Xn Paragraph No. 3 thereof, the court,,mentions in three places 
what It calls the "possible alternative1* rule. The Getty rule * 
was not that of "possible alternatives11
 r,.biiL^ that of "reasonable 
alternatives"* .Although it stated.it would follow the Getty 
rule, the court really adopted what Respondent had urged J>elow, 
the rule used,in condemning in easement of necessity wherein 
the condemnor must take the alternative causing the least possir 
ble injury to the land owner. A review of the evidence before 
the-Court inescapably shows.that only: under that misconception 
of the test to be applied .cauld the Court have reached the con-
elusions it did. 
CONCLUSION 
," Because of the.error by the trial court in computing dam-
ages to growing crops on the basis<of" the fair market value of 
the lands involved and because of the lack of evidence to support 
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The trial court's finding that Appellant acted unreasonably 
in locating the access road to the well location, as well as 
the obvious use by the court of a "possible alternative" rule 
rather than a proper test of whether the use was reasonable 
under the circumstances in reviewing the location of the access 
road and for the further reason that the trial court failed to 
afford Appellant the benefit of a written notice and sixty days 
within which to correct any breach of covenant specified in 
the notice, as required by the lease, the trial courtfs judg- r 
ment should be reversed and this case remanded for a decision 
in accordance with correct principles of law and the provisions 
of the Oil and Gas Lease involved. 
Respectfully Submitted, * • on' 
\ " ; MCKEACHNIE & SEAGER ' ^ : 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
* Attorneys for Appellant ' ' 
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